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Beyond IP—The Cost of Free:
Informational Capitalism in a Post-IP Era
GUY PESSACH*
Critical copyright scholarship rightly emphasizes the social costs of ordering cultural
production through proprietary intellectual property law regimes. This scholarship also
celebrates the virtues of free content and free access, particularly in digital domains. The
purpose of this article is to question this critique, which tends to pair proprietary intellectual
property protection with informational capitalism and the commodification of culture. This
article argues that the drawbacks of cultural commodification and informational capitalism
are also apparent in market-oriented media environments that are based on free distribution
of content. The article makes a novel contribution by untying the seemingly Gordian knot
binding proprietary IP to capitalist structures of corporate media. Media environments based
on free distribution of content are no less vulnerable to market powers. This analysis has
significant normative implications for the desirability of contemporary approaches that
advocate mobilization towards non-proprietary “beyond IP” legal regimes.
Les travaux critiques d’érudition sur le droit d’auteur insistent avec raison sur les coûts
sociaux liés au fait de régir la production culturelle par le biais du droit de la propriété
intellectuelle. Ces travaux vantent également les mérites du libre contenu et du libre
accès, particulièrement dans l’univers numérique. L’objectif de cet article est de remettre
en question cette critique qui cherche à associer la protection de la propriété intellectuelle
avec le capitalisme de l’information et la marchandisation de la culture. Cet article fait valoir
que les inconvénients du capitalisme de l’information et de la marchandisation de la culture
se retrouvent également dans l’univers médiatique axé sur le marché fondé sur la libre
distribution des contenus. Il crée un apport novateur en tranchant le nœud gordien qui semble
relier la propriété intellectuelle à la structure capitaliste des médias corporatifs. L’univers
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des médias fondé sur la libre distribution des contenus n’en est pas moins vulnérable aux
forces du marché. Cette analyse possède d’importantes implications normatives sur la
souhaitabilité de l’approche contemporaine qui préconise une mobilisation envers un régime
légal « au-delà de la propriété intellectuelle ».
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IN THE PAST TWO decades, legal scholars have written extensively about the

political economy of corporate media and the manner in which copyright
protection and proprietary control over creative works negatively affect such goals
and values as autonomy, self-fulfillment, creative freedom, political capability,
and cultural diversity.1
1.

See e.g. Brett M Frischmann, “Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend in Copyright Law” (2007)
3:3 Rev L & Econ 649 (questioning the efficiency of IP and copyright law in particular as a
mechanism for regulating cultural production); Yochai Benkler, “Free as the Air to Common
Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain” (1999) 74 NYU L
Rev 354 [Benkler, “Free as the Air”] (explaining copyright’s constraints on free speech and
democratic public discourse); Yochai Benkler, “Intellectual Property and the Organization of
Information Production” (2002) 22 Int’l Rev L & Econ 81 [Benkler, “Intellectual Property
and the Organization of Information Production”] (arguing that legal ordering of cultural
production through intellectual property regimes tends to enclose and narrow cultural
production to homogenous commercially viable creative works); Neil Weinstock Netanel,
“Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our System of Free Expression” (2000) 53:6 Vand L
Rev 1897 [Netanel, “Market Hierarchy”] (discussing the linkage between IP regimes and the
concentration of media markets, and demonstrating how copyright law establishes “speech
hierarchies” between, on the one hand, individuals and non-commercialized entities, and,
on the other hand, media conglomerates, while inflicting unequal capacities to participate in
speech activities and the democratic discourse); Margaret Chon, “Intellectual Property and
the Development Divide” (2006) 27:6 Cardozo L Rev 2821 (discussing the conflict between
IP law and distributive justice); Amy Kapczynski, “The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get
Beyond Intellectual Property Internalism” (2012) 59 UCLA L Rev 970 [Kapczynski, “The
Cost of Price”] (arguing that IP regimes bear costs not only in terms of efficiency but also
in terms of distributive justice and informational privacy); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling,
“Distributive Values in Copyright” (2005) 83 Tex L Rev 1535 at 1562-1566 (describing the
ways in which current copyright schemes conflict with distributive values); Margaret Chon,
“Intellectual Property from Below: Copyright and Capability for Education” (2007) 40 UC
Davis L Rev 803 (discussing copyright’s burdens on distributive values and human capacities,
particularly in the context of the right to education); Madhavi Sunder, “IP3” (2006) 59
Stan L Rev 257 (explaining and demonstrating the limits of current copyright schemes in
supporting and enhancing individual creativity).
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The basic argument of critical copyright scholarship is that the political
economy of informational capitalism is largely based upon the commodification
of informational and creative resources. Owners utilize these private entitlements
in ways that maximize profits but at the same time impair the public interest and
democratic values attached to speech, communication, and cultural activities.2
As a result, the commodification of culture through proprietary entitlements and
private control raises concerns from a democratic point of view.3
Critical copyright scholarship also emphasizes the copyright’s role in
shaping the political economy of corporate media.4 Control over the means of
production and distribution is gained through a mixture of government-issued
entitlements in creative resources (e.g., copyright) and distribution platforms
(e.g., telecommunications licenses).5 Within this framework, the traditional
corporate media model is based on producer-consumer relationships and the
copyrighting of culture—that is, the commodification of content through
proprietary protection.6 This economic model pivots around the extraction of
revenue from the distribution of and provision of access to content.7 At the same
time, a market-oriented media system fails to provide the public with the whole
array of media products that the society desires.8 Media markets tend to produce
a wasteful abundance of content that responds to mainstream tastes while
neglecting civically, educationally, and culturally pluralistic content.9 Additionally,
2.
3.
4.

5.
6.
7.

8.
9.

Ibid; See also Guy Pessach, “Copyright Law as a Silencing Restriction on Noninfringing
Materials: Unveiling the Scope of Copyright’s Diversity Externalities” (2003) 76 S Cal L Rev
1067 at 1076-1081, 1087-1097 [Pessach, “Copyright as a Silencing Restriction”].
See generally Ronald V Bettig, Copyrighting Culture: The Political Economy of Intellectual
Property (Michigan: Westview Press, 1996) at 79-103.
See Yochai Benkler, “From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation
Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access” (2000) 52 Fed Comm LJ 561 at 562
[Benkler, “From Consumers to Users”] (describing the manner in which telecommunications
law and intellectual property law allocate entitlements in creative resources and physical
distributions platforms).
Ibid.
Ibid; See also Pessach, “Copyright as a Silencing Restriction,” supra note 2 at 1076-1081,
1087-1092, nn 41-44.
See generally Harold L Vogel, Entertainment Industry Economics: A Guide for Financial
Analysis, 8th ed (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Pessach, “Copyright as a
Silencing Restriction” supra note 2; Bettig, supra note 3 at 79-103 (Indeed, the traditional
corporate media model is also highly dependent upon advertisement revenue. Nevertheless,
extracting direct revenues from distributing and selling content was and still is a pivotal
source of income for traditional corporate media).
See C Edwin Baker, Media, Markets and Democracy, (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2002) at 1-96 [Baker, “Media, Markets and Democracy”].
Ibid.
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the nature of corporate media as advertising-supported favours media products
that have a wide appeal and are suitable for selling the advertised products over
media that attends to the diversity of people’s actual needs and interests.10
The emergence of the Internet is perceived by critical copyright scholars as a
unique opportunity to significantly improve society’s informational and cultural
ecology, if only the right regulatory and legal choices are made.11 In broad strokes,
the argument is that new information technologies make it easier for individuals,
groups and communities to collaborate in producing and exchanging cultural
content, knowledge, and other information goods without requiring the
involvement of commercial, profit-motivated media entities.12 New, cheaper
methods of producing, storing, and distributing content provide fertile ground

10. Ibid at 24-30, 182-183.
11. See generally Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms
Markets and Freedom (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006) [Benkler, “The Wealth
of Networks”] (using economic, political and technological analyses to explain how new
information technologies make it easier for individuals to collaborate in producing cultural
content, knowledge and other information goods without requiring monetary incentives,
and thus calling to reduce the manner in which copyright law and telecommunications
law protect and advance the interests of producers and corporate media); Lawrence Lessig,
Remix: Making Art And Commerce Thrive In The Hybrid Economy (London: The Penguin
Press, 2008) [Lessig, “Remix”] (describing the prospects and creative potential of networked
communication platforms as well as the constraints imposed by IP laws); William W. Fisher
III, Promises To Keep; Technology, Law, and the Future of Entertainment (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2004) at 199-259 (offering compulsory licensing schemes that legalize
online content engagements, including file-sharing, among other purposes, in order to realize
the prospects of digitization while mitigating content owners’ dominance and control over
distribution channels); Jack M Balkin, “Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory
of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society” (2004) 79 NYU L Rev 1 (arguing
that: (a) digital technologies alter the social conditions of speech while making possible
widespread cultural participation and interactions that previously could not have existed on
the same scale; and (b) copyright law and telecommunications law impose both restrictions
and private ordering regimes of exclusivity that conflict with and restrict the prospects of
digitization); Jessica Litman, “Real Copyright Reform” (2010) 96 Iowa L Rev 1 at 12, 28,
30, 35 (describing how the economics of digital distribution now make it possible to engage
in mass dissemination without significant capital investment; and second, the fact that the
current, modest share of copyright that creators (as opposed to distributors) enjoy suffices to
inspire continued authorship. According to Litman, the accumulation of these two elements
seems to leave little justification for continuing a distributor-centric copyright system which
poorly serves both users and creators. Litman, therefore, calls for a significant reduction in
the proprietary copyright protection of intermediaries and distributors, and therefore, their
incentives to engage in the creative industries).
12. Ibid.
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for the emergence—and constant demonstration of the existence—of enhanced
schemes for sustaining culture and knowledge beyond IP.13
From this perspective, the traditional distributor-centric, proprietary-based
cultural and informational industries appear both unjustified and counterproductive
in terms of the public interest in cultural diversity, decentralization of media
spheres, and individuals’ self-fulfillment. It seems only natural that a shift from
producer-consumer cultural industries to civically engaged cultural spheres
would be feasible, if one could only dissolve the strong attachment of cultural
production to intellectual property protection as a governing institution.14
Critical copyright scholarship does not stop at criticizing the traditional
corporate media model, it also offers an alternative model of creative activities
that rests upon concepts of free content, free access, and openness.15 This
scholarship shows that there is much to be looked for beyond intellectual
property, particularly in light of persuasive evidence and arguments that authors’

13. See Balkin, supra note 11 at 6-12 (arguing that digital technologies alter the social conditions
of speech while making possible widespread cultural participation and interactions that
previously could not have existed on the same scale. Balkin also emphasizes the fact that
the digital revolution has: (1) drastically lowered the costs of copying and distributing
information; (2) made it easier for content to cross cultural and geographical borders; and (3)
lowered the costs of transmission, distribution, appropriation, and alteration of content while
commenting and building upon it.) Litman, supra note 11 at 1, 12, 28, 30, 35 (discussing
the ways in which digitization and networked communication technologies significantly
reduce the costs of producing, storing and distributing content and cultural products).
14. For a survey of such approaches see Guy Pessach, “Deconstructing Disintermediation – A
Skeptical Copyright Perspective” (2013) 33 Cardozo Arts & Ent LJ 833 at 835-38 [Pessach,
“Deconstructing Disintermediation”].
15. See Lessig, “Remix”, supra note 11 (arguing and demonstrating how digital technologies
provide tools for a “Read/Write” culture in which users and consumers take an active role
in cultural production for non-profit-motivated reasons. This in turn leads to cultural
and creative spheres in which models of sharing economy and hybrid economies flourish,
particularly if legal [de]regulation reduces the scope, scale and intensity of copyright
protection); Chris Anderson, Free: The Future of A Radical Price (New York: Hyperion,
2009) [Anderson, “Free”] (examining the rise of business models which give products and
services to customers for free, often as a strategy for attracting users and relying upon other
sources of revenues); Yochai Benkler, “Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the
Firm” (2002) 112 Yale LJ 369 [Benkler, “Coase’s Penguin”] (exploring and demonstrating
the virtues of commons based peer production in a networked environment); Anupam
Chander & Madhavi Sunder, “Everyone’s a Superhero: A Cultural Theory of “Mary Sue”
Fan Fiction as Fair Use” (2007) 95:2 Calif L Rev 597; Dan Hunter & F Gregory Lastowka,
“Amateur-to-Amateur” (2004) 46 WM & Mary L Rev 951 (elaborating on the rising role of
amateur culture in networked environments).
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and creators’ incentives are far more diverse than intellectual property’s direct
economic incentive.16
The purpose of this article is to untie the seemingly Gordian knot between
proprietary intellectual property protection and capitalist structures of corporate
media. I argue that media environments based on free distribution of content are
no less vulnerable to corporate market powers.17 Free content and departure from
traditional proprietary intellectual property regimes do not necessarily lead to
true, effective freedom for individuals.
Recent scholarship in the areas of communications studies and critical
Internet studies examines the emergence of a new political economy in which
networked information industries are built upon free flow of information
and content.18 This literature describes what many of us experience on a daily
basis: a highly concentrated industry in which revenues are extracted mostly
from selling advertisements and users’ personal data.19 The scholarship focuses
on informational capitalism, which uses data, information and content as
means of production and circulation to make profit and accumulate wealth.20
16. See Rebecca Tushnet, “Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions”
(2009) 51 WM & Mary L Rev 513 at 523-27; Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, “Copyrights as
Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That?” (2011) 12 Theor Inq L 29 (presenting findings and
arguments that authors’ and creators’ incentives deviate from copyright’s direct economic
incentive); Eric E Johnson, “Intellectual Property and the Incentive Fallacy” (2012) 39
Fla St UL Rev 623; Karl Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Knockoff Economy: How
Imitation Sparks Innovation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) (discussing the
empirical question of whether IP incentives matter for innovation); Benkler, “The Wealth
Of Networks”, supra note 11 (arguing that the technological, communicative and social
conditions of digital communication networks stimulate and facilitate civic-engaged
not-for-profit knowledge and cultural production activities).
17. See Part I below.
18. See Jaron Lanier, Who Owns the Future (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2013); Evgeny
Morozov, To Save Everything Click Here: The Folly Of Technological Solutionism (New
York: PublicAffairs, 2013); Astra Taylor, The People’s Platform: Taking Back Power And Culture
In The Digitial Age (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2014); Robert W McChesney, Digital
Disconnect: How Capitalism Is Turning The Internet Against Democracy (New York: The
New Press, 2013); James Curran, Natalie Fenton & Des Freedman, Misunderstanding the
Internet (Oxford: Routledge, 2012); Christian Fuchs, Internet and Society: Social Theory in the
Information Age (New York: Routledge, 2008).
19. See also Peter Menell, “Brand Totalitarianism” (2014) 47 UC Davis L Rev 787 at 805; Julie
E Cohen, “What is Privacy For?” (2013) 126 Harv L Rev 1904 at 1915-17; Morozov, supra
note 18 at 153-54, 161-63, 258-59, 349-50; Taylor, supra note 18 at 191-213; Curran,
Fenton & Freedman, supra note 18 at 82-84.
20. See Fuchs, supra note 18 at 99 (defining informational capitalism and discussing different
approaches to informational capitalism).
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The key features of this networked environment include a strong tendency
towards selling “eyeballs” (audience attention) to advertisers;21 utilization
of big data;22 and the use of information flows about consumer behaviour to
target advertisements, search results, and other content.23 Similar such features
include stealth advertisement; sophisticated systems of predictive analytics;24
commodification of consumers’ data;25 and free utilization of content.26 These
features represent a brave new world that is the opposite of what one anticipates
when looking beyond intellectual property protection. In such “beyond IP”
realms, industrialized corporate structures, media concentration, content biases,
abridged creative diversity, and deflated authorial welfare may outweigh the
drawbacks of traditional corporate media.27
A second, related aspect of informational capitalism is its growing
dependence on free content and information as elementary means of production.
In a political economy that does not extract revenues through the direct
commercialization and sale of content, but rather from the commercialization of
personal information and users’ attention, free content and free information are
the main bait for obtaining and monetizing both audience attention and users’
personal information.
21. See Part I below.
22. See Part I below. See also Lanier, supra note 18 (critically analyzing the downsides of a
networked economy in which users give away valuable information about themselves in
exchange for free online content, products and services; at the same time online firms
accrue large amounts of data—leading to concentrated wealth and power—at virtually
no cost); Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money
and Information (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015) (critically describing and
analyzing big data practices and their utilization for leveraging price discrimination practices,
profits and power).
23. Katherine J Strandburg, “Free Fall: The Online Market’s Consumer Preference Disconnect”
(2013) U Chicago Legal F 95 at 122-32 (surveying different online business models of
behavioural and contextual advertising that are based on users’ data collection, including
their online activities, engagements and searchers).
24. See Pasquale, supra note 22 (critically surveying a variety of areas in which predictive analysis
are being utilized for marketing, price discrimination, and financial gains practices).
25. See Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, “To Track or “Do Not Track”: Advancing Transparency
and Individual Control in Online Behavioral Advertising” (2012) 13 Minn J L Sci &
Tech 281 at 335; Giacomo Luchetta, “Is the Google Platform a Two-Sided Market?”
(Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali, 2012), online: <https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2048683>; Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka, “Targeted Online Advertising: What’s the
Harm & Where Are We Heading” (The Progress & Freedom Foundation Progress on Point
Paper, Vol 16, No 2, 2009), online: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1348246>.
26. See Part I below.
27. See Part I, below, for more on this topic.
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Spheres beyond intellectual property thus represent a social contradiction
between their empowering functions and their vulnerability to exploitation and
commodification. Free flow and distribution of content undoubtedly stimulate
social conditions that empower individuals, promote innovation, and advance
cultural democracy. Yet, at the same time, they provide no safeguards against
patterns that imitate the logic and drivers of proprietary cultural industries.
In fact, they simultaneously create new opportunities to make profits and
accumulate property through the commodification and commercialization of
users’ attention and personal information.
Although the emergence of networked informational capitalism is well
addressed in the academic literature,28 there is hardly any reference to the linkage
between networked informational capitalism and components, both legal and
ideological, that are derived from and associated with free distribution of content
in cultural and informational zones in which intellectual property’s governance is
less salient. I argue that informational capitalism is linked not only to elements
of proprietary control, but also to elements of free flow and non-proprietary
modes of content circulation. This argument questions the conventional wisdom
of critical copyright scholarship, which tends to pair proprietary protection with
informational capitalism and the commodification of culture.29
By making this claim, I am not arguing for the restoration of an expansionist
and intellectual property-centric approach. I do argue, however, that certain
segments of free content markets stimulate pressures that go against the values
of a democratic culture.30 Moreover, I argue that conceptual frames such as “free
culture” can impair the ability to fully comprehend and respond to the challenges
imposed by the contemporary industrial economics of freely distributed content.31
This argument bears significant normative implications because it emphasizes the
28. See e.g. Cohen, supra note 19 at 1915; Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society (West
Sussex: Blackwell, 1996) at 14.
29. For the conventional approach see e.g. Netanel, “Market Hierarchy”, supra note 1; Niva
Elkin-Koren, “It’s All About Control: Rethinking Copyright in the New Information
Landscape” in Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel, eds, The Commodification of
Information (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002) 79 at 105-109; Benkler, “Free as
the Air” supra note 1; Mark S Nadel, “How Current Copyright Law Discourages Creative
Output: The Overlooked Impact of Marketing” (2004) 19 Berkeley Tech LJ 785.
30. See Balkin, supra note 11 at 6-12 (presenting and elaborating on the characteristics of a
democratic culture).
31. See Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology And The Law To Lock
Down Culture and Control Creativity (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004) (popularizing the
term “free culture” as a counter to the common proprietary model of corporate media and
cultural production).
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limits and fickleness of the call for copyright deregulation as a means to advance
the public interest. On the contrary, intellectual property may, paradoxically, have
a role to play in culminating and mitigating informational capitalism. Intellectual
property may play a dual role in this regard: first, by shifting revenue sources
and incentives back to the creative content itself (from advertisements and the
commercialization of users’ personal data),32 and second, by decentralizing the
market power of networked corporate media platforms.33
Indeed, there is a contradiction between the manner in which intellectual
property’s control and commodification functions nourish corporate media,
on one hand,34 and the manner in which intellectual property may counterbalance
informational capitalism on the other hand.35 The regulatory challenge, therefore,
is to acknowledge and respond to the fact that the drawbacks of market-oriented
media environments are based on free distribution of content.
The article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the political economy of
contemporary markets based on free distribution of content. Part II discusses the
implications of these findings for copyright policy. Part III concludes.

I. INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM BEYOND IP
Examination of contemporary communicative and cultural spheres reveals that
creative and informational zones beyond the traditional proprietary corporate
media model occupy prominent segments of the Internet. Much of people’s
informational engagements, both as conveyors and as recipients, are conducted
through frameworks and platforms that rely upon open access to and free flow
of content.36 Many such activities are stripped of intellectual property regulation.
Even if intellectual property protection applies to these activities in theory,

32. Ibid at 288.
33. See also Guy Pessach, “Deconstructing Disintermediation – A Skeptical Copyright
Perspective” (2013) 33 Cardozo Arts & Ent LJ 833 at 865-68 [Pessach, “Deconstructing
Disintermediation”].
34. See Pessach, “Copyright Law as a Silencing Restriction”, supra note 2 at 1092, 1077-1081,
1097 (discussing how in an industrial, corporate-media institutional structure, broad
and extensive copyright protection tends to support commercialized mass-media
products and restrict other forms of creative and cultural engagements); See also
Elkin-Koren, supra note 29.
35. See Part II below.
36. See e.g. Andrson, Free, supra note 15; Benkler, “The Wealth of Networks”, supra note 11;
Lessig, “Remix”, supra note 11; see also major online platfroms such as YouTube <www.
youtube.com>; Instagram <www.instagram.com>.
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as a practical matter the operative communicative and business models presume
free distribution of content and information.
Search engines’ retrieval services, the blogosphere, content-sharing platforms,
certain types of online music services, online newspapers, social networks, instant
messaging, voice services and many other segments of our informational and
cultural lives are now “free as the air to common use.”37 Content, information
and other types of creative output are distributed for free. Resources such as
photographs, video clips, visual images, game applications, music, and textual
materials may be formally protected by copyright and other types of intellectual
property rights,38 yet the economic and communicative schemes through which
they are produced and exchanged are in many instances schemes of free access and
free distribution. As a matter of law in action, intellectual property rights do not
function as a mechanism to govern the production, exchange and distribution of
such creative materials.
At least to some degree, this shift was less a consequence of well-planned
ex ante reforms to intellectual property law, and more a consequence of the
Internet’s unique technological and communicative conditions.39 At the same
time, legal policy also partially supported the creation and expansion of zones
that are practically ungoverned by proprietary intellectual property regimes. The
United States provides several prominent examples in this regard: (a) the broad
interpretation and application of the fair use defense, including in the context

37. Benkler, “Free as the Air”, supra note 1.
38. Copyright Act, RSC 198, c C-42, s 5(1). (Copyright’s subject matter covers, among other
works, literary works, dramatic works, musical works and artistic works).
39. See Anderson, “Free”, supra note 15; Benkler, “The Wealth of Networks”, supra note 11
(presenting the theory that networked communication platforms are characterized by the
attributes of scale, scope and production capacity, which in turn empower non-market
forms of social production); Balkin, supra note 11 (arguing that digital technologies alter
the social conditions of cultural and creative engagements while making possible widespread
cultural participation and interactions that previously could not have existed on the same
scale). Balkin also emphasizes the fact that the digital revolution has: (1) drastically lowered
the costs of copying and distributing information; (2) made it easier for content to cross
cultural and geographical borders; and (3) lowered the costs of transmission, distribution,
appropriation, and alteration of content while commenting and building upon it); Ibid.
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of search engines’ activities;40 (b) a limited and narrow approach to third party
liability for contributory copyright infringement;41 (c) the creation of safe harbours
for content-sharing platforms through notice and takedown procedures;42 and
(d) the narrow interpretation of the distribution right in digital domains.43
40. See Kelly v Arriba Soft Corp, 336 F (3d) 811 (9th Cir 2003) (determining that reproduction
and public display of thumbnail-sized images of visual materials within the results pages of a
search engine are considered fair-use); Perfect10 Inc v Amazon.com Inc, 508 F (3d) 1146 (9th
Cir 2007) (characterizing a search engine’s display of thumbnail images as fair use under the
transformative use doctrine); Authors Guild Inc v HathiTrust, 755 F (3d) 87 (2d Cir 2014)
(determining that the creation of a database of ten million books, of which perhaps up to
seven million were protected by copyright, using digitized copies of books from research
library collections, is considered fair-use as long as the database is utilized only as a full-text
searchable information resource that allows patrons to find books relevant to their research
projects); Authors Guild v Google Inc, 804 F (3d) 202 (2d Cir 2015) (determining that
Google’s scanning of millions of books and indexing their contents to serve up some snippets
in response to user search queries is a transformative fair-use).
41. See Sony Corp of America v Universal City Studios Inc, 464 US 417 (9th Cir 1984) followed
by MGM Studios Inc v Grokster Ltd, 545 US 913 (US 2005). Under the Sony decision,
one who manufactures and distributes a technology will not be liable for infringement
committed by its users as long as the technology has “substantial non-infringing uses.” The
Grokster decision, which dealt with the legality of a piece of file-sharing software, added to
the Sony test a requirement that the maker must not have acted with the intent of inducing
its users to infringe copyright. Under the Sony decision and the Grokster decision, there is an
immunity from indirect liability for copyright infringement for technologies that are capable
of substantial non-infringing uses unless there is inducement to infringe copyright).
42. See 17 USC § 512(c) (2012) [DMCA]; Viacom International Inc v YouTube Inc, 676 F
(3d) 19 at para 39 (2d Cir 2012) [Viacom]; UMG Recordings Inc v Shelter Capital Partners
LLC, 667 F (3d) 1022 (9th Cir 2011) [UMG]; Capitol Records Inc v MP3tunes LLC, 821 F
Supp (2d) 627 (SDNY 2011) [Capitol]; Io Group Inc v Veoh Networks Inc, 586 F Supp (2d)
1132 (ND Cal 2008) [Io Group]. See also Mary Rasenberger & Christine Pepe, “Copyright
Enforcement and Online File Hosting Services: Have Courts Struck the Proper Balance?”
(2012) 59:3 J Copyright Soc’y USA 627 at 662. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
enacted in 1998 and codified in Title 17, § 512 of the United States Code, includes four
main safe harbours for Internet service providers. Section 512(c) provides a safe harbour for
hosting services providers. Court rulings regarding section 512(c) vary in their nuances, but
at the end of the day, the general direction of courts is that content sharing platforms also
benefit from § 512(c)’s safe harbour.
43. See Peter S Menell, “In Search of Copyright’s Lost Ark: Interpreting the Right to Distribute
in the Internet Age” (2011) 59:1 J Copyright Soc’y USA 201 (surveying and critically
analyzing the interpretation of the exclusive right of distribution (17 USCS § 106(3) in
digital contexts). As Menell demonstrates, the courts’ inclination was to adopt a narrow
interpretation of the distribution right, which does not apply the distribution right in digital
contexts. See also Capitol Records Inc v Thomas, 579 F Supp (2d) 1210 (D Minn 2008)
(concluding that the distribution right applies only with regard to the distribution of copies
of a copyrighted work and not their making available digitally).
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These are all examples of a US legal policy that facilitated and legitimized
large-scale networked activities beyond the reach of intellectual property’s
proprietary control, affecting even profit-motivated corporate media activity.44
The Canadian legal situation seems less clear and homogenous in this regard.
Although the Supreme Court of Canada has explicitly acknowledged the status
of users’ rights in copyright law, this acknowledgment has not resulted in further
judicial decisions to parallel the United States approach of narrowing copyright
owners’ proprietary control.45 Indeed, in what is known as the “Copyright
Pentalogy,” the Supreme Court of Canada issued, in one day, five copyright
decisions, all of which represent a public-regarding approach towards copyright
law.46 None of these decisions, however, indicates either explicit or implicit
support for the establishment of contemporary networked media environments
(as the aforementioned US court decisions indicate).
In its earlier SOCAN decision—which was not a part of the Copyright
Pentology—the Supreme Court of Canada was asked to decide the legality of
Internet service providers’ caching of music files.47 In its decision, the Court
explicitly protected the ability of Internet service providers to deploy innovative

44. See sources cited supra notes 40-43 (most of the cases cited involved large-scale profit
motivated corporate entities such as Google, YouTube (owned by Google) and Amazon,
which have successfully sheltered themselves within IP’s negative spaces).
45. CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 SCR 339, 236 DLR (4th) 395.
46. Alberta (Education) v Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright), [2012] 2 SCR
345, 347 DLR (4th) 287; Entertainment Software Association v Society of Composers, Authors
and Music Publishers of Canada, 2012 SCC 34, [2012] 2 SCR 231; Rogers Communications
Inc v Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 2012 SCC 35, [2012] 2
SCR 283; Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Bell Canada, 2012
SCC 35, [2012] 2 SCR 326; Re:Sound v Motion Picture Theatre Associations of Canada, 2012
SCC 38, [2012] 2 SCR 376. For a further discussion of these cases see Michael Geist, The
Copyright Pentalogy: How the Supreme Court of Canada Shook the Foundations of Canadian
Copyright Law (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2013).
47. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Canadian Assn of Internet
Providers, 2004 SCC 45, [2004] 2 SCR 427.
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technologies such as caching to improve Internet efficiency.48 In BMG Canada Inc
v John Doe, the Federal Court determined that downloading a song for personal
use falls within the private copying exemption in subsection 80(1) of the Copyright
Act.49 The Court stated that uploading a musical file through a peer-to-peer
file-sharing platform does not constitute infringement either. On appeal, the
Federal Court of Appeal, declined to rule whether copyright infringement indeed
took place. Notwithstanding this refusal, the appellate decision still included
several remarks to support the conclusion that both downloading and uploading
of copyrighted files through a peer-to-peer file-sharing network might constitute
copyright infringements. For one, the Court of Appeal questioned whether
peer-to-peer file sharing indeed involves reproduction on an “audio recording
medium” and therefore could be sheltered under the exemption for private
copying. In addition, the Court of Appeal questioned whether, in the context of
peer-to-peer file-sharing, the act of private copying is done “for the purposes of
distribution” and would therefore fall outside the exemption for private copying.
Lastly, the Court of Appeal doubted the lower court’s interpretation of the terms
“authorization” and “distribution” while raising the possibility that these terms
are broad enough to capture actions that make copyright-protected materials
available for downloading through peer-to-peer networks. Altogether, the BMG
Canada Inc v John Doe affair cannot be classified as a decision that leans towards
the creation and expansion of zones that are practically ungoverned by proprietary
intellectual property regimes.
Together with the unique attributes of networked communication
platforms,50 legal policies to expand zones ungoverned by proprietary intellectual
48. More specifically, Internet service providers were privileged from liability for copyright
infringement under section 2.4(1)(b) of the Copyright Act, which exempts from liability a
“person whose only act in respect of the communication of a work or other subject-matter
to the public consists of providing the means of telecommunication necessary for another
person to so communicate the work or other subject-matter” at para 27. In deciding so, the
Supreme Court emphasized the “public interest in encouraging intermediaries who make
telecommunications possible to expand and improve their operations without the threat of
copyright infringement” at para 114. The court added that “to impose copyright liability on
intermediaries would obviously chill that expansion and development” (para 114) and that
“the creation of a “cache” copy, after all, is a serendipitous consequence of improvements
in Internet technology, is content neutral, and…ought not to have any legal bearing on the
communication between the content provider and the end user” (para 115). “Caching” the
court added, “is dictated by the need to deliver faster and more economic service, and should
not, when undertaken only for such technical reasons, attract copyright liability” (para 116).
49. See BMG Canada Inc v John Doe, 2004 FC 488, [2004] 3 FCR 241, aff’d in part 2005 FCA
193, [2005] 4 FCR 81.
50. See supra notes 11, 13-15, and 39 and accompanying text.
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property regimes have influenced the centrality, scope, and scale of free content
distribution within creative and information industries. YouTube was established
as a leading platform for free audio-visual and musical content due in large part
to the safe harbour for content sharing platforms established by section 512(c)
of the United States Digital Millennium Copyright Act.51 Instagram owes its
centrality as a platform for sharing photographs and visual images to the same
provision.52 Google Books’ legality is based entirely on the US fair use defense.53
Online music services such as Last.fm54 are able to provide free access to music
through a technological design that relies on the legality of embedding content
from other platforms’ content.55 A variety of other content exchange and
distribution platforms are based on US copyright law’s narrow approach to third
party liability, including the rule that technological devices capable of substantial
non-infringing uses are not subjected to contributory liability.56 For example,
software such as Kodi/XBMC,57 which facilitates free distribution of content
including copyright-protected content, is immune from copyright infringement
liability, a fact that ensures its widespread use.
By making these observations, I am not arguing that such legal policies
may not be justified on their particular merits.58 I do argue, however, that such
legal policies, taken together, contributed to the emergence of a new cultural
ecosystem in which commercial and profit-motivated corporate media entities
cluster around and build upon the free distribution of content.
51. See Viacom, supra note 41; See also Pessach, “Deconstructing Disintermediation”, supra
note 14 at 863-67.
52. Instagram, “How do I report a claim of copyright infringement?”, online: <www.help.
instagram.com/277982542336146?ref=related> (Instagram also claims to function as a
content-sharing platform, which shelters it under section 512(c) of the DMCA).
53. The Authors Guild Inc v Google Inc, 804 F 3d 202 (2015).
54. Last.fm, “Hello & Welcome to Last.fm.”, online: <www.last.fm>.
55. See Perfect 10 Inc v Amazon.com Inc, 508 F 3d 1146, 1154 (9th Cir 2007); Perfect 10,
Inc v Google Inc, No CV 04-9484, 2010 WL 9479060 at 1 (CD Cal 2010), 653 F 3d
976 (9th Cir 2011) (in which it was determined that the embedding of content from
other websites through techniques such as framing and inline linking does not amount to
copyright infringement).
56. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
57. Kodi, <www.kodi.tv/download>. Kodi, formerly known as XBMC, is an open source
(GPL) software media center for playing videos, music, pictures, games, and more.
As a technology which is capable of substantial non-infringing uses, the distribution of Kodi
is not exposed to indirect liability for copyright infringement. Kodi, however, works on
“AddOns,” which utilize Kodi’s interface to provide access to a variety of content, including
copyright-protected materials.
58. Supra note 41; supra note 42; supra note 43.
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The traditional corporate media model was based on a producer-consumer
relationship and the copyrighting of culture—that is, the commodification of
content—through proprietary protection.59 Extracting direct revenue from the
distribution of, and provision of access to, content was the crux of the traditional
economic model.60 This traditional model is now being partially replaced by a
new business model that relies upon free access and free distribution of content.
This new business model is based mostly on revenue extracted from the sale of
advertisements and users’ personal data.61 The strategic business goal of maximizing
clicks, repeat visits, and time spent visiting particular websites is intertwined
with the goal of maximizing the effectiveness of advertising, including sponsored
content and stealth marketing.62 Optimized commercialization and utilization of
mass-aggregated personal information is another fundamental building block of
the networked economy.63
Communicative spheres of free content thus represent a social contradiction
between their empowering functions and their vulnerability to exploitation and
commodification. Free flow and distribution of content undoubtedly stimulate
social conditions that empower individuals, promote innovation and cultural
democracy, while simultaneously failing to provide safeguards against patterns
that imitate the logic and driving forces of proprietary cultural industries.64 In fact,
such social conditions simultaneously create new opportunities for profits and
property accumulation that are achieved mostly through the commodification
and commercialization of users’ attention and personal information.

59. See Benkler, “From Consumers to Users”, supra note 4; Pessach, “Copyright as a Silencing
Restriction”, supra note 2 at 1076-1081, 1087-1092; see also supra note 41-43 and
accompanying text.
60. See sources cited supra note 7.
61. See Menell, supra note 19 at 805; Cohen, supra note 19 at 1915; Morozov, supra note 18
at 153-54, 161-63, 258-59, 249-50; Taylor, supra note 18 at 191-213; Curran, Fenton &
Freedman, supra note 18 at 82-84.
62. Ibid; See also Ellen Goodman, “Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity” (2006) 85 Texas
L Rev 83; Eli Pariser, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet is Hiding From You (New York: The
Penguin Press Group, 2001) at 60; Joseph Turow, The Daily You: How the New Adverting
Industry is Defining Your Identity and Your Worth (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011)
at 88; Ira S Rubinstein, Ronald D Lee & Paul M Schwartz, “Data Mining and Internet
Profiling: Emerging Regulatory and Technological Approaches” (2008) 75 U Chicago Law
Rev 261; Ryan Calo, “Digital Market Manipulation” (2014) 82:4 Geo Wash L Rev 995.
63. See Cohen, supra note 19; Pasquale, supra note 22; Strandburg, supra note 23 at 122-32.
64. See supra note 11; supra note 13 and the accompanying text.
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The partial creative destruction65 of traditional corporate media models is
therefore more complex and challenging than scholarship and public advocacy
has presumed.66 Contemporary networked media environments are at least to
some degree a postmodern version of the “Culture Industry” originally analyzed
by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer with regard to the emergence of
traditional mass media.67 Adorno and Horkheimer described the emergence of
industrialized production and distribution of standardized cultural goods by
mass communications media. According to their analysis, products of the culture
economy take the appearance of artwork but are in fact dependent on industry
and economy, meaning they are subjected to the interests of money and power
and are designed for profit.68 Adorno and Horkheimer further described the
manner in which the culture industry manipulates mass society by cultivating
false psychological needs that can only be met and satisfied by the products of
corporate mass media capitalism while driving people into passivity due to the
false illusion of democratic cultural participation.69
Networked cultural environments based on free distribution of content tend
to follow similar patterns. Structures of media dominance established through
centralized regulatory and proprietary control are now being replaced by elements
of openness, interactivity and participation.70 This transformation is not just a
shift in the structure and economy of creative industries. It is also a symbolic
ideological process that confronts the perils of the old corporate media model with

65. Joseph A Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc, 1942) at 81-85 (arguing that ordinary competition between similar
competitors with slightly differentiated products is not the source of much consumer benefit.
Rather, monopoly and oligopoly are undercut by the emergence of “the new commodity, the
new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organization” that “strikes [at]…
the existing firms[’]…foundations and their very lives.” This process, which Schumpeter calls
“creative destruction,” “expands output and brings down prices”).
66. See supra notes 1-4, 7-8, and 10, and the accompanying text.
67. Theodor W Adorno & Max Horkheimer, The Dialectic of Enlightenment, translated by
Edmund Jephcott (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002) at 94.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid; See also Bill Ryan, Making Capital From Culture: The Corporate Form of Capitalist
Cultural Production (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1991) at 184; Iain Chambers, Popular
Culture: The Metropolitan Experience (New York: Routledge, 1986); John Fiske, Reading the
Popular (New York: Routledge, 2010); John Fiske, Television Culture (New York: Routledge,
2010); Andrew Ross, No Respect for Intellectuals (New York: Routledge, 1989) (developing
Adorno & Horkheimer’s approach).
70. See e.g. Balkin, supra note 11; Benkler, “The Wealth of Networks”, supra note 11.
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the prospects of digitization and networked communication platforms.71 At the
same time, however, the open, accessible, interactive and participatory Internet
is a platform for industrialized production and distribution of standardized
informational goods capable of generating and commercializing traffic, users’
attention, and personal information. Such informational goods appear to be the
products of a free digital culture, but many of them are in fact subjected to the
interests of money and power.72
Like the cultural industry, networked informational capitalism also generates
false illusions of democratic cultural participation. Behind the veil of free flow
are categorical limits to the capacities of content and information as shared
resources, even for those who contribute to their production. Individuals’
content and information may be “free as the air” to common use,73 but as
Jeron Lanier demonstrates, the proceeds of aggregating and analyzing peoples’
interactions with such content and information are de facto propertized without
transparency.74 In many circumstances, individuals who create free content lack
access to the data essential to reach tailored audiences, distribute their content
effectively, determine pricing schemes, or even identify the recipients of their
speech activities. In Lanier’s language, these are all privileges to which only a
handful of siren servers’ operators are entitled.75
The resemblance between Adorno and Horkheimer’s framing of “the
culture industry as mass deception”76 and contemporary networked media
environments has two elements: (a) the prominence of industrialized production
and distribution platforms; and (b) false illusions regarding people’s cultural
capacities as both creators and recipients. By making this argument, I do not
attempt to undermine the fundamental positive transformation that the Internet
and digital technologies have brought in terms of empowering people’s capacities
as creators and recipients of creative content. I do argue, however, that many
of these individual, autonomous engagements are simultaneously exploited
71. See e.g. McChesney, supra note 18 at 109; Matteo Pasquinelli, “The Ideology of Free Culture
and the Grammar of Sabotage” in Daniel Araya & Michael A Peters, eds, Education in
the Creative Economy: Knowledge and Learning in the Age of Innovation (New York: Peter
Lang, 2010) 285; Christian Fuchs, “Information and Communication Technologies and
Society: A Contribution to the Critique of the Political Economy of the Internet” (2009)
24:1 Eur J Comm 69.
72. See Lanier, supra note 18; Morozov, supra note 18 at 63; Taylor, supra note 18 at 197, 217.
73. Benkler, supra note 1.
74. Supra note 18 at 48, 113.
75. Ibid at 63.
76. Adormo & Horkheimer, supra note 67 at 94.
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by large-scale, profit-motivated corporate networked industries that leverage
free content environments as opportunities for profit and as their means of
production.77 These industries also use frames and concepts of “free culture”
and “openness” in order to disguise both their goals and the consequences of
their activities.78
One method of further understanding the effects of contemporary
networked media environments is by evaluating them according to the same
parameters under which the political economy of traditional corporate media has
been critically examined,79 including media concentration and barriers to entry;
content diversity and the nature and characteristics of the media products being
produced; and such basic values as privacy, personal autonomy, free speech and
distributive values.
A critical evaluation of networked free content distribution platforms reveals
that these platforms overcome some of the shortcomings of the traditional
corporate media model in a variety of ways. Amateur and user-generated
content,80 collaborative media, and commons-based peer production81 are just a
few examples of the manner in which networked free information and content
platforms diversify cultural production and empower bottom-up individual
and civically-engaged creative engagements.82 At the same time, however, the
drawbacks associated with contemporary networked media environments
parallel, and to some degree even exceed, those associated with the traditional
corporate media model.
In terms of media concentration and barriers of entry, the networked
environment is highly concentrated: Google controls around 70 per cent of
search services,83 YouTube controls around 70 per cent of online video clips &
music video services,84 and Facebook accounts for more than 50 per cent of social
77. See also Jason Lanier, You Are Not A Gadget (New York: Vintage Books, 2011) at 76.
78. See supra note 71; supra note 72.
79. See generally Baker, “Media, Markets, and Democracy”, supra note 8; Guy Pessach, “Media,
Markets, and Democracy: Revisiting an Eternal Triangle, Critical Notice: Media, Markets
and Democracy” (2004) Can JL & Jur 209 at 210-15 [Pessach, “Media, Markets and
Democracy, Critical Notice”].
80. See e.g. Chander & Sunder, supra note 15; Hunter & Lastowka, supra note 15.
81. See e.g. Benkler, “Coase’s Penguin”, supra note 15.
82. See also Lessig, “Remix”, supra note 11 at 177-224; See also Lessig, “Remix”, supra note 11 at
177-224; Benkler, “The Wealth of Networks”, supra note 11 at 116-27, 212-32, 273-300.
83. See Curran, Fenton & Freedman, supra note 18 at 89. See also Eli M Noam, Media
Ownership and Concentration in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) at
273-94, 424-25.
84. Ibid.
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networking traffic.85 This highly concentrated environment is partially explained
by network effects that give an advantage to large-scale intermediaries.86 It also
results from the centrality of advertisement revenue as a source of income in a
networked environment. The bigger the platform, the better it is for generating
advertising revenue. Advertisers looking for content, data brokers looking for
information, content distributors looking for audiences, and audiences looking
for content are driven back to familiar platforms, which thus procure, maintain,
and increase market dominance.87
A second parameter under which the political economy of the traditional
corporate media model has been critically examined is content diversity and
the characteristics of the media products being produced.88 Here also, a close
inspection reveals that contemporary networked media environments might
also undermine content diversity under certain conditions. Market economy
settings structured around free content incentivize what seems to be an extreme
version of the traditional “market for eyeballs” and advertisement-supported
85. Ibid.
86. Albert-laszlo Barabasi, Linked: The New Science of Networks (Cambridge, MA: Perseus
Publishing, 2002) at 73-77; Bernardo A Huberman & Lada A Adamic, “Growth Dyanmics
of the World-Wide Web” (1999) 401 Nature 131; Lada A Adamic & Bernardo A Huberman,
“Power-Law Distribution of the World Wide Web” (2000) 287:5461 Science 2115;
Albert-Laszlo Barabasi & Reka Albert, “Emerging of Scaling in Random Networks” (1999)
286:5439 Science at 509-12; Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2010) at 132-33 (arguing that network effects, or network externalities,
are “markets in which the value that consumers place on a good increases as others use the
good”); Mark A Lemley & David McGowan, “Legal Implications of Network Economic
Effects” (1998) 86:3 Cal L Rev 479 (arguing that in the context of information and content
intermediaries, the more popular the platform is, the more valuable and usable it is to both
content providers and content consumers).
87. See generally Florence Thepot, “Market Power in Online Search and Social Networking:
A Matter of Two-Sided Markets” (2013) 36:2 Kluwer L Intl 195.
88. See Noam, supra note 83 at 273-94, 424-25; C Edwin Baker, Media Concentration and
Democracy: Why Ownership Matters (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) at
93-113 (describing and explaining the tendency toward media concentration in networked
communication platforms); Lincoln Dahlberg, “The Corporate Colonization of Online
Attention and the Marginalization of Critical Communication?” (2005) 29 J Comm Inquiry
160 (describing the colonization and concentration of audience attention in a networked
environment). See also Anita Elberse, “Should You Invest in the Long Tail?” (2008) 86 Harv
Bus Rev 88 (arguing, based on online sales data, that the Internet increases the relative power
of hits); Anindya Ghose & Bin Gu, “Search Costs, Demand Structure and Long Tail in
Electronic Markets: Theory and Evidence” (2006) NET Institute Working Paper No 06-19,
online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=941200> (arguing that the internet is skewed towards
popular content in terms of search costs).
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content distribution platforms.89 The reason is straightforward: if advertisements
and user traffic are becoming the sole source of revenue, then information
and content production must follow a formula that maximizes user traffic and
audience exposure to advertisements. This, in turn, causes wasteful investment in
duplicative, homogenous content that is likely to achieve this result. Additionally,
contemporary networked media environments also impose pressures that weaken
other competing models of content production and content distribution,
particularly models based on extracting direct revenue from the sale of content.
After all, competition against “zero pricing” models is all but impossible. “Free,”
as a predatory pricing mechanism, leaves limited market share for creative and
informational works that extract direct revenue from selling content.
The political economy of contemporary networked media environments also
raises concerns about informational privacy and content diversity. To reiterate,
contemporary networked media environments are substantially structured
around industrially commodified utilization of personal information.90
Networked corporate media entities utilize and trade packets of information
about consumers for purposes such as targeted advertising, price discrimination,
and risk management templates that maximize the extraction of surplus from
consumers.91 This reality, which is usually discussed through the prism of privacy
concerns,92 also implicates the characteristics and attributes of the media products
being produced.
The economy of monetizing personal information and predictive big data
businesses requires communicative and informational products that are suitable
for and that maximize the collection and utilization of large quantities of valuable
information, including social networks, content sharing platforms, photo sharing
applications, and other forms of online engagement. Along with their speech
and communicative functions, such platforms also function as informational
89. For an analysis of the traditional corporate media market for consumer attention see
Baker, “Media Markets and Democracy”, supra note 8 at 24-30, 182-83; Edwin C Baker,
“Advertising and a Democratic Press” (1992) 140:6 U Pa L Rev 2097 (providing factual
evidence and analyzing the prominent influence that advertisers have on the content of
media products within advertisement-supported media entities); Robert McChesney, The
Political Economy of Global Communication, (London: Pluto Press, 1998) at 19.
90. See Menell, supra note 19 at 805; Cohen, supra note 19 at 1915; Morozov, supra note 18
at 153-54, 161-63, 258-59, 349-50; Taylor, supra note 18 at 191-213; Curran, Fenton &
Freedman, supra note 18 at 82-84; Pasquale, supra note 22; Strandburg, supra note 23 at
122-32; supra note 60.
91. See also Lior Strahilevitz, “Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law” (2013) 126:7 Harv L
Rev 2011; Cohen, supra note 19.
92. Ibid.
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ecosystems with relatively narrow and repetitive content offerings. People are
being channelled toward and accustomed to communicative spheres in which
tracking, analysis, prediction, and marketing are highly efficient and effective.93
Firms are thus disincentivized to invest in content production because they
are instead able to extract significant revenue from the monetization of users’
personal information.94 Incentives to invest in diverse content and cultural
products are likewise being partially replaced by incentives to invest in virtual
environments and utilities that attract users’ traffic and personalized information.
The growing centrality of the collection of personalized information as a
means of production also has a distributive dimension. Free content platforms are
indeed effective at making information and content shared resources.95 Networked
platforms are also largely based on an end-to-end design that decentralizes and
democratizes cultural production and cultural distribution.96 At the same time,
however, users, content creators, and individuals do not have access to the data
that are gathered, processed, utilized and commercialized by networked platforms,
social networks, and search utilities operators even though such data are essential
in order to reach tailored audiences, effectively distribute content, determine
pricing schemes, and identify the recipients of speech activities.97 Content and
information may indeed be free to use.98 Yet the outcomes of aggregating and
analyzing peoples’ interactions with such content and information are de facto
propertized by networked corporate entities without transparency as to what data
are gathered, processed, utilized, and commercialized, and how. This, in turn,
causes distributive disparities between the effective capacities of networked
corporate platforms and the effective capacities of individuals to capture
audience attention.
To summarize my argument so far: contemporary networked media
environments are increasingly structured around free distribution of content.
93. Turow, supra note 62; Pariser, supra note 62.
94. See e.g. Cohen, supra note 19 at 1912-1917; Strahilevitz, supra note 91 at 2022-2024;
Omer Tene and Jules Polonetsky, “Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of
Analytics” (2013) 11 Nw J Tech & Intell Prop 239.
95. See Benkler, “The Wealth of Networks” supra note 11; Brett M Frischmann, “Peer-to-Peer
Technology as Infrastructure: An Economic Argument for Retaining Sony’s Safe
Harbor for Technologies Capable of Substantial Non-infringing Uses” (2005) 52 J
Copyright Soc’y USA 329.
96. See Mark A Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, “The End of End-to-End: Preserving the
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era” (2000) 48 UCLA L Rev 925; Barbara van
Schewick, Internet Architecture and Innovation (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2010).
97. See Tene & Polonetsky supra note 94 at 254-55.
98. Benkler, “Free as the Air”, supra note 1.
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In a close inspection, such environments suffer from drawbacks similar to the
drawbacks of the traditional corporate media proprietary model. Along with
the costs of intellectual property production, the production and distribution
of market-based free content might also create a host of disadvantages. Free
content, therefore, may not be as desirable as the critical copyright scholarship
had presumed. With these concerns in mind, Part II examines the implications
of this argument for copyright law policy.

II. IMPLICATIONS FOR COPYRIGHT LAW POLICY
Socio-economic conditions of networked communication platforms catalyzed
the emergence of free content market-based networked environments.99 Reduced
costs of producing, distributing, and accessing content and information made
intellectual property proprietary schemes less dominant.100 At the same time,
copyright law policy stimulated the emergence and growth of the corporate
free content model. My purpose in this Part is to examine the role of copyright
law policy in that regard by using the example of the approach of United States
copyright law to the liability of content-sharing platforms (e.g., YouTube) for
copyright infringement.
The US Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), enacted in 1998 and
codified in Title 17, § 512 of the United States Code, includes four main safe
harbours for Internet service providers.101 Section 512(c) provides a safe harbour
for network hosts that store “[i]nformation residing on systems or networks at
[the] direction of users,” including, for example, servers that host users’ websites.
In this respect, § 512(c) limits service providers’ liability for copyright-infringing
content posted or hosted at the direction of end users.102
This provision protects those service providers that receive no “financial
benefit directly attributable to … infringing activity,” where the provider has
neither the right nor the ability to control the infringing activity and where,
if properly notified, the service provider suppresses access to the infringing
content.103 It does not protect service providers with actual or constructive
knowledge of infringing content who fail to move quickly on their own initiative
99. See supra note 11, 13-15, 39 and the accompanying text.
100. See Benkler, “The Wealth of Networks”, supra note 11 at 59-127; supra 13-15, 39 and the
accompanying text.
101. See DMCA, supra note 41.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid.
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to disable access.104 The legislative history of § 512(c) lists as an example of the
applicability of the safe harbour “providing server space for a user’s web site, for
a chatroom, or other forum in which material may be posted at the direction
of users.”105 Material not covered under § 512(c), on the other hand, includes
material ‘‘that resides on the system or network operated by or for the service
provider through its own acts or decisions and not at the direction of a user.”106
A central question arose with the emergence of Web 2.0 and content sharing
platforms: whether and under what conditions content sharing platforms may be
sheltered under the safe harbour of § 512(c). Several scholars, including Timothy
Wu and Lawrence Lessig, argued that § 512(c)’s safe harbour also applies to the
activity of content sharing platforms and other types of Web 2.0 applications.107
Lessig pointed out that with the enactment of the DMCA, the safe harbours
for Internet service providers were part of a quid pro quo for the enactment of
anti-circumvention prohibitions.108 Copyright owners were given much more
control over their portfolio of copyrighted works, but Congress simultaneously
reduced the liability of content intermediaries and service-providers by shifting
from an opt-in strict liability regime to an opt-out “notice and take down” regime.109
Overall, US courts have followed Lessig’s interpretation. Court rulings vary
in their nuances, but at the end of the day, the general direction of US courts is
to confer upon content sharing platforms the benefit of § 512(c)’s safe harbour

104.
105.
106.
107.

Ibid.
HR Rep No 105-551(II) (1998) at 53 [House Report 105-551(II)].
Ibid.
See Lawrence Lessig, “Make Way for Copyright Chaos” The New York Times (18 March
2007), online <www.nytimes.com/2007/03/18/opinion/18lessig.html>; Tim Wu, “Does
YouTube Really Have Legal Problems?” Slate (26 October 2006), online: <www.slate.
com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2006/10/does_youtube_really_have_legal_
problems.html> (reporting that “in 1998, [information residing on systems or networks at
direction of users in § 512(c)] meant Geocities and AOL user pages. But in 2006, that means
Blogger, Wikipedia, Flickr, Facebook, MySpace, and, yes, YouTube—all the companies whose
shtick is ‘user-generated content’”).
108. Lessig, supra note 104.
109. House Report 105-551(II), supra note 102 at 54.
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for hosting services providers.110 This legal regime is indeed beneficial if one
considers the value of the safe harbour in supporting user-generated content,
amateur content and new channels of distribution.111 Concurrently, however,
this legal regime has had other consequences:112 it has effectively immunized the
costless provision of large repertoires of copyright-protected works in a way that
has channelled audience attention to a handful of global entities that have now
obtained a dominant bottleneck market position.113
YouTube is a paradigmatic example in this regard. The unprecedented
market position that YouTube has managed to obtain is mostly due to § 512(c)’s
safe harbour regime, which enabled YouTube to host endless amounts of popular
copyright-protected cultural materials and thus establish market dominance.114
The growing popularity of the platform was largely based on its ability to
host entire portfolios of copyright-protected works. These network economic
realities—specifically the ability to host content without any need to obtain ex
ante authorization from copyright owners due to the safe harbour’s limited legal
risk—facilitated the economic and cultural conditions for the current market
domination of YouTube.115
110. See UMG, supra note 41; Capitol, supra note 41; Io Group, supra note 41; Rasenberger &
Pepe, supra note 41; Viacom, supra note 41. Viacom is the most prominent case in this regard.
In it, after five years in the courts, the Second Circuit finalized parameters for applying §
512(c) in the context of content sharing platforms, such as YouTube, while determining that
content sharing platforms may benefit from § 512(c)’s safe harbor according to the following
determinations and parameters: (a) content sharing platforms fall within the definition of
“service provider” in § 512(c); (b) knowledge or awareness of facts or circumstances that
indicate specific and identifiable instances of infringement is a prerequisite for the obligation
to remove and take down infringing materials; (c) “the right and ability to control” infringing
activity does not require “item-specific” knowledge of infringement, but a general ability to
remove or block access to materials posted on a service provider’s website does not suffice.
What is required is some type of “substantial influence on the activities of users,” without
necessarily acquiring knowledge of specific infringing activity; and (d) software functions
of replication, playback and the related videos feature occur “by reason of the storage at the
direction of a user” within the meaning of 17 USC § 512(c)(1).
111. Supra note 15.
112. Supra note 83; supra note 83; supra note 87.
113. See also Pessach, “Deconstructing Disintermediation”, supra note 14 at 862-67.
114. YouTube, “Statistics”, online <www.youtube.com/yt/press/en-GB/statistics.html>; Alexa,
“youtube.com Traffic Statistics” (October 2016), online <http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/
youtube.com>. YouTube is the second most popular website. There are more than one billion
unique users visiting YouTube every month—almost a third of the people on the Internet.
YouTube is in seventy countries and seventy six languages. Approximately eighty percent of
users’ traffic is outside the US.
115. Supra note 86.
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Practically, § 512(c)’s safe harbour regime, which only obliges YouTube
to remove infringing materials ex post facto in response to takedown notices
from copyright owners, was a protective shield in establishing YouTube’s
market dominance. It supported rapid growth in the platform’s popularity and
the immense portfolio of popular copyright-protected content that it hosted.
Furthermore, legal policy under which the embedding of YouTube’s content in
third party websites does not amount to copyright infringement further enhanced
the platform’s popularity and dominant position as a global content repository. 116
With YouTube’s procurement of its dominant market position came an
increase in bargaining power to leverage a move toward business models based
on collaboration and revenue sharing with creators and rights holders. Authors,
creators and rights holders are thus faced with a dominant and highly popular
intermediary that attracts a significant portion of audience attention and is already
partially shielded from legal liability for hosting their materials. Under such
conditions, YouTube has considerable ability to legitimize its content activities on
its own terms.117 Authors, creators, and performers have very few options other
than to agree to YouTube’s terms and conditions or risk vanishing from audiences’
awareness. These terms and conditions tend to be fixed, non-negotiable for most
contributors, and based on one unilateral business model of free content and
monetization only through advertising revenue.118
YouTube is a good example of a free content corporate market model.
Formally, it operates within the boundaries of copyright law. Practically,
however, with the backing of § 512(c)’s safe harbour regime, it establishes
market mechanisms based upon monetization through free distribution of
copyright-protected content. The entire playing field of free content distribution
is built upon this premise, which also influences the conduct, expectations,
and preferences of its repeat participants, including the platform itself, content
contributors, users, ancillary intermediaries (through content embedding),
advertisers, data brokers, and marketers.
The YouTube model also demonstrates the complex and contradictory
nature of free content market mechanisms. There are many positive spillovers
in such an environment, which functions as a commons infrastructure affecting
peoples’ capacities, both as speakers and as recipients, to access, distribute, and
utilize creative and informational content. The YouTube model also demonstrates
the negative dynamics of contemporary networked media environments,
116. Supra note 42; supra note 55.
117. See Pessach, “Deconstructing Disintermediation”, supra note 14 at 844-54, 862-67.
118. Ibid.
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including: unilaterally-coded boilerplate compensation schemes that undermine
contributors’ welfare while relying solely on advertising revenue;119 pressure toward
ruinous competition to manufacture blockbuster hits that generate popularity
and audience attention;120 an extremely concentrated distribution layer;121 intense
convergence between product placement, brand marketing, stealth advertisement
and creative content;122 and limited investment in content production along with
targeted delivery of content based on personal data collection.123
Given the immeasurable amount of content freely available through
YouTube, it may seem counterintuitive to question the platform’s vitality
and social contribution. Yet, upon closer inspection, there is a distinction
between YouTube’s function as a repository for past materials124 and its ex ante
content production and distribution functions. Along with its contribution to
bottom-up, decentralized cultural exchange, there are limits to YouTube’s cultural
production function. YouTube demonstrates that contemporary networked
media environments, which are based on limited exposure to copyright liability,
provide no guarantee against restrictive contractual and technological terms
imposed on the platform’s users and contributors, including restrictions that
override copyright exemptions.125
Altogether, this amounts to a cycle in which a content-sharing platform
such as YouTube advocates and advances limited copyright liability while at the
same time utilizing its leveraged centrality and market power to impose rules
and practices that limit the powers and capacities of third party contributors
and users. A copyright law policy that supports a broad safe harbour for content
sharing platforms results, therefore, in mixed outcomes. It induces bottom-up
decentralized users’ contribution. Yet, it also supports and advances the interests
of networked corporate media entities that rely upon a business model of free
content distribution.
119. Ibid at 844-54.
120. Ibid.
121. See Curran, Fenton & Freedman, supra note 18 at 89. See also Noam, supra note 83 at
273-94, 424-25.
122. See Menell, supra note 19 at 798-808.
123. See Pariser, supra note 62; Turow, supra note 62.
124. For an explanation of YouTube’s functions as a repository, see Guy Pessach, “[Networked]
Memory Institutions: Social Remembering, Privatization and its Discontents” (2008) 71
Cardozo Arts & Ent LJ 85-91.
125. Guy Pessach, “Reciprocal Share-Alike Exemptions in Copyright Law” (2008) 30:3 Cardozo
Arts & Ent LJ 1245 at 1264-1267; Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, “Accountability
in Algorithmic Enforcement: Lessons from Copyright Enforcement” (2015) Stanford
Tech L Rev 41-48.
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III. CONCLUSION
Critical copyright scholarship over the past two decades has largely focused on
the social costs of proprietary copyright protection and of the legal ordering
of cultural production through intellectual property regimes. Along with its
criticism of intellectual property protection, critical copyright scholarship has
also celebrated the virtues of free content and free access, particularly in digital
domains. My purpose in this article was to question this conventional wisdom,
which tends to pair proprietary intellectual property protection with informational
capitalism and the commodification of culture. Similar drawbacks are apparent
also in the context of market-oriented realms based on free distribution of
content. Media environments that are based on free distribution of content are
no less vulnerable to corporate market powers. This analysis bears significant
normative implications on the desirability of contemporary approaches, which
support mobilization toward non-proprietary legal regimes beyond IP.

